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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH. : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
Case No. 20050743-CA 
LANCE NELSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty of one count of possession of an 
imitation controlled substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 
58-37b-4 (1953) as amended and one count of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37a-5(l) 
(1953) as amended. The trial court sitting with a jury found the Defendant 
guilty on all counts on May 31, 2005. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(e). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Point I 
WAS THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT OF 
POSSESSION OF AN IMITATION CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE AND POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter of 
law and fact whether the evidence at trial supported the defendant's conviction. 
"When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal jury trial, we 
begin with the threshold issue of statutory interpretation, which we decide as a 
matter of law. With regard to the facts, 'we review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict of the jury.'" State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 355(Utah Ct. App. 
1995)(quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah 1992)(citations 
omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: This issue was properly 
preserved for appeal by the timely motion to dismiss made by defense counsel 
at the close of the State's case. (R. 235 / 109). 
POINT II 
DID THE IONSCAN OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
DOORKNOB CONSTITUTE A SEARCH IN VIOLATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS AND THEREFORE SHOULD ALL EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED BE SUPPRESSED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Appellate Court reviews "search and seizure 
issues for correctness", based on an examination of the totality of the 
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legal conclusions. (State v. Naranjo, 118 P.3d 285, 288, (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
and State v. Rynhart, 125 P.3d 938, 941, (Utah 2005)). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE ON APPEAL: This issue was properly 
preserved for appeal by the timely filing of a motion to suppress and the 
hearing thereon. (R. 18 ,45, & 71). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
§ 58-37b-4. Manufacture, distribution or possession of imitation 
controlled substance unlawful— Penalty 
It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, or possess with intent 
to distribute, an imitation controlled substance. Any person who violates this 
section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
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76-6-405. Theft - Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
§77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a 
defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged with a violation of one count of possession 
of a controlled substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (1953) as amended, one count of possession of an imitation 
controlled substance, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37b-4 
(1953) as amended and one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a Class 
B misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §58-37a-5(l) (1953) as amended. (R. 1). 
The felony charge was dismissed at the preliminary hearing and the defendant 
pled not guilty to the misdemeanors. (R. 16). The defendant timely filed a 
motion to suppress and a hearing was held and the trial court denied the 
motion. (R. 18 ,45, & 71). A jury found the Defendant guilty of both charges 
on May 31, 2005. (R. 179). The Defendant was sentenced on July 21, 2005, 
to an eighteen-month probation and to serve 80 days in jail. The amended 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was entered on August 11, 2005 (R. 
191-193.) On August 23, 2005, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. (R. 
207). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 17, 2003, an affidavit and application for a search warrant 
was signed and presented to Judge Roger S. Dutson, judge of the Second 
Judicial District Court. (R. 34 attached as addendum B). The officer signing 
the affidavit set forth his training and then listed the following allegations as 
probable cause: 
• On December 10, 2002, (one year prior to the affidavit) the officer had 
made a traffic stop on a vehicle leaving the house and discovered 2.65 
grams of methamphetamine, and was told by the driver that Lance 
Nelson sells meth from the house. 
• On December 8, 2003, the officer watched two different individuals go 
to the house, enter the basement door and leave 15 minutes later. 
• On December 10, 2003, the officer watched two individuals go to the 
house, enter the basement door and leave 15 minutes later. 
• On December 15, 2003 the officer watched three different individuals go 
to the house, enter the basement door and leave about 15 minutes later. 
The officer stopped one of these individuals who told him that he saw 
Lance Nelson remove about % ounce of crystallized substance from his 
pants pocket and showed it to him. 
• The officer stated in the affidavit that two of the above individuals were 
known to him as having prior drug offense convictions. This was 
apparently confirmed by the running of a records check on the owners of 
the vehicles they were driving. 
• On December 16, 2003, under the cover of darkness, the officer 
stealthily approached the house and swabbed the doorknob of the 
basement door of the defendant's house. The officer then ran the 
collected sample through an Ionscan 400B. This device detected the 
presence of cocaine. 
Based upon the above affidavit the judge issued a search warrant. 
At a suppression hearing held on November 23, 2004, Lieutenant Mike 
Ashment, the commander of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force was 
called to the stand. Lt. Ashment testified concerning a piece of equipment 
called an Ionscan. (R. 233 / 8) An Ionscan is a device which tests a swab of an 
object, in the case at bar, an outside doorknob of a house, for the presence of 
drugs. Lt. Ashment opined that a "positive result obtained from the Ionscan in 
and of itself, in my view, would not be sufficient evidence to show probable 
cause for the issuance of a search warrant." (R. 233 /10) He further stated that 
his office has a policy that an application for a search warrant would not go to 
the judge based only on the evidence of a positive ion scan test. (R. 233 / 11) 
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At that hearing defense counsel argued that the defendant's rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure were violated in several respects. First, 
"the Ionscan itself is a search that was conducted without a warrant." (R. 233 / 
13). Second, the Ionscan test is not reliable, and therefore could not be the 
basis for a valid search warrant. (R. 233 / 18). Finally, the remaining items 
listed on the affidavit for a search warrant were insufficient to establish 
probable cause necessary for a search warrant. (R. 233 /19, 20). 
The court issued a written ruling on January 4, 2005, (80-107 addendum 
B) in which he stated "the police conduct here lies within - but barely within -
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." (R. 83). The court ruled that the 
entry into the curtilage was proper, and the collection of the swab from the 
doorknob was permitted under the open-view doctrine. (R. 94, 98). The court 
distinguished the taking of a swab, which he deemed permissible, from the 
search of a garbage can next to a house, which he acknowledged was 
impermissible. (R. 89). Finally, the court ruled that "swabbing the door does 
not constitute a seizure because a resident does not have a significant 
possessory interest in the tiny particles captured by the swab. (R. 89). 
The case then went to jury trial on May 31, 2005, with the Honorable 
Michael D. Lyon presiding. At the trial the State called Agent Karen Mcintosh 
who assisted in the search of the defendant's home. At the home they found a 
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baggie of some substance together with a straw, a spoon, a broken light bulb, a 
sport bottle with a tube and a glass pipe which she testified were commonly 
used for ingesting methamphetamine. (R. 235 / 47-50). 
Agent Rusty Olsen, also with the strike force, testified that prior to the 
search warrant being issued he observed several individuals going into and out 
of the house in a manner consistent with drug traffic. Based on what he 
observed he obtained a search warrant. (R. 235 / 60). He testified in a similar 
manner to Agent Mcintosh regarding the paraphernalia and the baggie found at 
the home. He testified regarding the baggie of white substance that it was a 
large enough quantity (8.5 grams) that a normal dealer "is intending on either 
i 
breaking it up into those quarter gram uses and selling cem off at those and/or 
half gram uses to one gram." (R. 235 / 80 (sic)) 
The parties had stipulated that "there was no controlled substance 
identified [i]n the baggie or the paraphernalia items in this case." (R. 235 / 83). 
The agent admitted that they did not find scales (one of the most important 
pieces of paraphernalia a drug dealer uses) or any controlled substances in the 
home. (R. 235 / 88). He also admitted he had no evidence to back up the 
agents assumption that he was considering selling the (non-controlled) 
substance contained in the baggie. (R. 235 / 89) 
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Agent Stewart Hackworth testified that at the time the residence was 
being searched he had a conversation with the Defendant. After asking the 
Defendant if there was something they should be aware of in the home the 
Defendant stated, "Man, all's that was in there are two pipes and a baggie of 
shit." He further told the officer where those items would be found in the 
house. (R. 235 / 99). The Defendant further explained to the officer the baggie 
contained a pesticide that he put there because "he kept getting his narcotics or 
his shit stolen'5. He also told the agent that if someone happened to steal that 
baggie that "whatever they get they deserve". (R. 235 / 100). The agent 
observed the baggie found in the home and testified that it was consistent in 
appearance "with methamphetamine or crystal meth". (R. 235 / 101). He told 
the officer that he was trying to get out of the drug business, but if they had 
been there a month earlier they may have found some drugs. (R. 235 /102) 
The State then rested and the defense moved for a dismissal of the 
imitation controlled substance charge on the grounds that the State had failed to 
provide any evidence that the Defendant possessed, or manufactured the 
substance with the intent to distribute that substance. (R. 235 / 108). The only 
evidence before the jury was that the Defendant had the substance set out in the 
event that someone decided to steal something from him that they would take 
that substance. The court denied the motion. (R. 235 /109) 
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After closing arguments the jury returned with a verdict of guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance and guilty of possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant believes that the trial court erred in two instances during 
the course of the proceedings. First, in the pretrial motion to suppress the 
evidence, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence on the grounds 
of a Fourth Amendment violation. The officer violated the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights when he approached the Defendant's home under the cover 
of darkness and seized particulates present on his doorknob. The officer 
admitted that he had snuck up to the door as to not be discovered, and then 
handled the doorknob to obtain the sample. This seizure was thereafter used to 
obtain a search warrant, and therefore any evidence obtained as a result of this 
illegal intrusion should be suppressed. 
Even if this Court fails to reach the issue of the illegal search, the 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed on grounds of insufficient evidence. 
In the case at bar the State failed to prove the presence of any controlled (or 
non-controlled) substance on the items of paraphernalia, and further failed to 
establish that the Defendant possessed the pesticide for the purpose of 
10 
distribution. Those failures are fatal to the State's case and the Defendant 
therefore asks this Court to reverse the conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED AT TRIAL 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT 
OF POSSESSION OF AN IMITATION CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE AND POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA. 
The Defendant recognizes that in reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence in a jury verdict, the standard of review is narrow. See, State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. 
State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1987). As long as there is some 
evidence, including reasonable inferences, "from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
The Courts power "to review a jury verdict challenged on grounds of 
insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Rudolph, 3 P.3d 192, 196 (2000). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has said, cc[s]o long as there is some evidence, 
including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." State v. 
Mead 27 P.3d 1115, 1132 (Utah 2001) (citations omitted). Additionally, in 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993), the Court stated, 
cc[o]rdinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury 
verdict." 
The Utah Appellate Courts have, however, ruled that absent sufficient 
evidence establishing each element of the offense charged, an Appellate Court 
may overturn a conviction. Furthermore, UCA §77-17-3 requires a trial court 
to discharge a defendant where there is "not sufficient evidence" to support a 
conviction. In State v. Workman, infra at 985, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court's arrest of judgment from a conviction of sexual 
exploitation of a minor holding: "A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is 
based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative 
possibilities of guilt." In that case, the prosecution presented no evidence, 
expert or otherwise, that the photograph in question could have been taken for 
purposes of sexual arousal. Given that lack of evidence the Court vacated the 
defendant's guilty verdict. Similarly, in the case of State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
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443 (Utah 1983), the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant in a second-
degree murder case where the evidence as to intent was deficient. In that case 
there was undisputed evidence that the victim had been murdered. The sole 
evidence against the defendant consisted of the fact that the defendant was the 
last person seen with the victim, and the fact that he had related a dream to 
three individuals in which he recalled slapping the girl and that he "thought he 
hurt her. He thought he might have killed her." Id. at 446. In that case, the 
Court also stated: 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable 
to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the evidentiary 
fabric as far as it will go. But this does not mean that the court can 
take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a 
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be 
sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 444-445. 
Furthermore, in the recent case of State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94 (Utah 
2002), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conviction of 
evidence tampering. In that case, there was some expert testimony that opined 
that a second, smaller knife had also been used in a murder of an individual. 
No other evidence as to a second weapon (the first weapon was recovered) was 
found, but rather, the prosecution relied on an inference that the defendant had 
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the motive and opportunity to dispose of a second weapon. In reversing that 
conviction, the Court held: 
After giving full weight to all of the evidence supporting [the 
defendants] conviction of evidence tampering, we conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. At most, the 
evidence supports only the proposition that [the defendant] had the 
opportunity to destroy or conceal the second implement, if indeed 
it ever existed. Id. at 100. 
In State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that "criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or 
probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a 
quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged . . ." Id. 
at 402. 
Finally, in the case of State v. Gonzales, 2 P.3d 954 (Utah Ct. App. 
2000), this Court reversed the defendant's conviction of tampering with 
evidence where the State failed to present any credible evidence, other than 
inferences, that the defendant had concealed either a gun or some marijuana 
after an official proceeding had commenced. 
"We will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the 
evidence." State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(internal quotations and alterations omitted). We simply cannot 
conclude that the State introduced sufficient evidence to support 
all the elements of evidence tampering beyond a reasonable 
doubt. (State v. Gonzales at 959) 
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While the Defendant is cognizant of the requirement to marshal evidence 
in support of the jury's verdict, the Defendant submits that even with an 
extensive marshaling of evidence the jury's verdict cannot be supported. 
In the case at bar, the evidence that was presented at trial does not meet 
the statutory elements of possession of an imitation controlled substance or 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Although the Defendant recognizes the facts 
when viewed in light most favorable to the jury's verdict would clearly indicate 
the officers at the scene conducting the search found a baggie of pesticide and 
some items that could be used for the ingestion of drugs, the Defendant further 
informed the officers that the pesticide would be found in his house, but that he 
had put it there in the event someone came into his house and stole the baggie. 
Furthermore, the State conducted a drug analysis on the contents of the baggie 
as well as most of the items of supposed paraphernalia and found no trace of 
any controlled substance. The Defendant also told the officer that he was no 
longer using or selling any drugs. The discovery of the items listed above 
could support both theories of the case. At best, the evidence "supports only 
the proposition" {State v. Gonzales infra.) that the defendant possessed the 
alleged paraphernalia for use in a drug habit. 
The more troubling charge is that of possession of an imitation 
controlled substance. UCA §58-37b-4 provides in relevant part: 
It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, or 
possess with intent to distribute, an imitation controlled 
substance. 
The language is clear in that the Defendant must "manufacture, 
distribute or possess with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance. 
While Defendant acknowledges that the substance in question appeared and 
was packaged in a manner that looked like methamphetamine, that in and of 
itself is not sufficient to prove the Defendant guilty of the crime. The element 
of distribution in one form or another is required to establish guilt. Either the 
Defendant must have distributed or manufactured or possessed with intent to 
distribute the substance in order to be found guilty. The evidence produced at 
trial was insufficient to prove any of the above. The best evidence for the 
prosecution is that the Defendant had the substance in his home for the unlikely 
event that someone intended to steal the substance. Webster's dictionary 
defines "steal" as: "to take or appropriate without right or leave and with intent 
to keep or make use of wrongfully." Utah law defines theft as ccexercis[ing] 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof." (§76-6-404). 
Both of these definitions exclude the possibility that the owner wants 
the item taken. Likewise in the case at bar, the fact that the Defendant put the 
pesticide in a baggie in case someone stole it contradicts the proposition that 
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the Defendant "manufactured or possessed with intent to distribute" the 
substance. As pointed out by trial counsel to find otherwise the court would 
open the theft statute to absurd results. A person could be found guilty of a 
second degree felony theft under an accomplice theory if he left his keys in an 
unlocked car in his driveway, since someone might decide to steal the vehicle 
and the victim would be guilty of abetting the taking of his vehicle. 
The State may argue that the Defendant possessed the substance with the 
intent to distribute. This argument fails for lack of evidence. The burden of 
proof is on the State to prove each element of the offense. The evidence 
produced at trial did not establish any such instance. The fact that the officers 
observed several individuals go to the home and leave does not rise to the level 
of beyond a reasonable doubt. This is particularly true where the one person 
stopped coming from the home several days before the search did not have any 
controlled substance or any imitation controlled substance on his person. 
The fact that one unnamed individual was stopped after leaving the 
house and told the police that he was in the house and was shown a crystalline 
substance is of little value. This information is problematic in that the 
unnamed individual didn't give an explanation as to why he/she was shown the 
substance. He/she didn't admit to buying anything, and the fact that he/she did 
not buy any drugs contradicts the reliability of the officer's assertions that the 
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visits observed indicated drug trafficking. In all likelihood the crystalline 
substance that the informant observed was the pesticide in the baggie. 
Given that reasonable doubt, the evidence should be determined to be 
insufficient to support a conviction, and the convictions on the evading and the 
interfering with arrest should be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE IONSCAN OF THE DEFENDANT'S DOORKNOB 
CONSTITUTED A SEARCH IN VIOLATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND 
THEREFORE ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 
provides in relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated" The Courts on both the state and federal level have defined when a 
seizure is unreasonable. 
In Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27,31, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001), the Court noted 
"With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of a home is 
reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no." The Court in Kyllo 
was presented with a case where the government utilized a thermo-vision-
imaging device to detect the presence of UV lights used for growing 
marijuana. The officer stood outside the home when he operated the device. 
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The Court, while recognizing the fact that the officer had not intruded into the 
home, nevertheless held: 
Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in 
general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, 
the surveillance is a "search'5 and is presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant. (Id. at 40) 
In the case of California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,37, 108 S. Ct. 1625 
(1988), the Supreme Court held that the "warrantless search and seizure of 
garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home" does not violate the 
Fourth Amendment. This Court has likewise held "Utah citizens do not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out for collection beyond the 
curtilage of a home". (See State v. Jackson, 937 P.2d 545, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) emphasis added). 
The key to these decisions, however, is that the defendants had 
abandoned their right to an expectation of privacy once they placed the garbage 
sacks out on the curb for collection. In the present case, the officer came onto 
the Defendant's property, within the curtilage, and manipulated the doorknob 
and seized particles therefrom. The Defendant should enjoy an expectation of 
privacy from this type of seizure given the fact that touching and manipulating 
the doorknob is an act that commences the entrance into a home. 
The state presumes that an officer has a right to manipulate a doorknob. 
That assumption belies common sense as well as established case law. First, 
using a sidewalk to a door is something less intrusive than using the doorknob. 
The act of manipulating a doorknob is an act akin to attempting to enter the 
home. If done without permission this constitutes an illegal intrusion. Second, 
there are a number of cases where the act of turning or manipulating a 
doorknob constitutes an overt act that qualifies as the requisite step in an 
attempted burglary. A citizen that has an expectation of being safe from a 
burglar attempting to break in by handling his doorknob would certainly have a 
similar expectation of privacy from an officer similarly handing that same 
doorknob. 
In State v Serrano, 880 A.2d 183 (Conn. App. 2005), the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals held that the turning of a doorknob and the insertion of a fork 
past the door lock striker "supports the conviction of attempt to commit 
burglary". (Id at 194). 
In State v. Hicks, 733 So.2d 652 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1999), the Louisiana 
Court of Appeals held an officer had reasonable suspicion of attempted 
burglary allowing him to conduct an investigatory stop and pat down where a 
complainant claimed that an individual opened an unlocked screen door, tried 
the doorknob, and walked to the side of a house. (Id at 655). 
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Finally, in State v. Payne, 625 A.2d 231 (Conn. App. 1993), the 
Connecticut Court of Appeals held that evidence supported a conviction of 
attempted burglary where the victim heard her storm door open, heard her 
doorbell ring repeatedly, heard a knock on a door and heard the defendant 
"jiggle the doorknob." One of the defendants put his hand in the mail slot and 
then the police arrived and arrested the defendants. (Id at 372). 
These cases support the idea that the Defendant had an expectation of 
privacy regarding the intruding eye of a scientific Ionscan seizure of substances 
on the doorknob of his basement door. The Fourth Amendment protects this 
privacy interest just as surely as the Forth Amendment protects a defendant's 
right to be free from the intruding eye of a thermo-vision device that picks up 
heat emanating from the home that is also seized from the outside of the home. 
Once this Court has established that there was a constitutionally 
impermissible search and seizure of the Defendant's doorknob, the next issue is 
to what extent does this constitutional violation affect the subsequent evidence. 
In the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963), the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated, "The exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from 
trial physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of 
an unlawful invasion." The Court further reinforced the gravity of Fourth 
Amendment protections in the home by stating, 
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In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional 
guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held nearly half a 
century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could 
not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383. The exclusionary prohibition extends 
as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions. 
{Wong Sun v. United States, at 484). 
The Utah Courts have likewise followed the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine. In the case of State v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 
1998) the Court held: 
Absent an exception to the exclusionary rule, Mapp requires us to 
exclude "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 
violation of the Constitution/' Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 
1691. There is no dispute that the stop of defendant at the Tibbie 
Fork Canyon traffic checkpoint was unconstitutional. Nor is there 
any dispute that, absent the good faith exception, all evidence 
obtained subsequent to defendant's stop should be suppressed as 
"fruit of the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 
471, 487-88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
In the case at bar, there is no question that the officers impermissibly 
seized the Defendant's property when, under cover of darkness, they went to 
the Defendant's home and swabbed the doorknob. Once that seizure occurred, 
any evidence obtained should be suppressed as a violation of the Defendant's 
constitutional rights, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. In the 
present case, that suppression should include all evidence obtained from a 
subsequent search of the home under the authorization of a search warrant. The 
original seizure of evidence from the doorknob was the reason the magistrate 
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issued the search warrant. The warrant and search pursuant to that warrant 
would therefore constitute fruit of the poisonous tree. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the conviction of the Defendant on the grounds that the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offenses 
charged. In the alternative, the Defendant requests this Court to reverse the trial 
courts decision denying the Defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the 
grounds of an illegal search and seizure. 
DATED this 6th day of February 200 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
LANCE NELSON, 
Defendan t 
f\\U\\.Aji MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041900483 FS 
Judge: MICHAEL D. LYON 
Date: July 21, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: shannone 
Prosecutor: BILL DAINES 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 12, 1964 
Video 
Tape Number: L072105 Tape Count: 3:11 
CHARGES 
2. MFG/DIST/POSS IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBST - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/31/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and 
represented by Martin Gravis. 
V. o 1 
Case No: 041900483 
Date: Jul 21, 2005 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of MFG/DIST/POSS IMITATION 
CONTROLLED SUBST a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 90 day(s) in the Weber County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 80 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 30 day(s) in the Weber County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 3 0 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
These sentences shall run concurrently with each other. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 2 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $472.97 
Due: $1000.00 
Charge # 3 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$300.00 
$0.00 
$151.35 
$300.00 
$1300.00 
$0 
$624.32 
$1300.00 
Plus Interest 
SCHEDULED TIMEPAY 
The following cases are on timepay 041900483. 
The defendant is to pay $100.00 monthly on the 1st. 
The number of payments scheduled is 13. 
The first payment is due on 08/01/2005 the final payment of $33.57 
is due on 09/01/2006. The final payment may vary based on 
interest. 
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Case No: 041900483 
Date: Jul 21, 2005 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Ogden Second District Court. 
Defendant to serve 10 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Weber County Jail. 
Defendant is to report by July 22, 2005 by 8:00 a.m.. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1300.00 which includes the surcharge 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall maintain full-time, verifiable employment. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a substance abuse class 
through Professional Services Corporation, and pay all associated 
costs. 
The defendant shall successfully complete a mental evaluation and 
any treatment deemed necessary through Professional Services 
Corporation, and pay all associated costs. 
The defendant shall reimburse Weber County $250 for public 
defenders representation through Second District Court. 
Dated this [f day of *k}jf\ 2ofe^ 
MICHAEL D. LYON 
District/Court Judge 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LANCE NELSON, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Case No. 041900483 
After obtaining a search warrant, police searched Defendant's house and found contraband. 
Defendant now challenges the sufficiency of the warrant and seeks to suppress the evidence found 
as a result of the search. Because the police did not violate Defendant's reasonable expectation of 
privacy prior to obtaining the warrant, and because the warrant rests upon an affidavit showing 
sufficient probable cause to support the warrant, the Court denies Defendant's motion to suppress 
the results of the search. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On December 17, 2003, Judge Dutson issued a search warrant based on an affidavit signed 
by North Ogden Police Detective Rusty Olsen. In the affidavit, Detective Olsen recited the following 
facts as the basis for probable cause to search the Defendant's home: 
• On December 10, 2002, over a year prior to signing the affidavit, Detective Olsen stopped 
a vehicle that had left the Defendant's home and discovered methamphetamine belonging 
n°n 
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to the vehicle occupants, who infoimed Detective Olsen that the Defendant sold 
methamphetamme fiom his home 
While conducting suiveillance on the Defendant's home on Decembei 8 and 10, 2003, 
Detective Olsen obseived seveial vehicles amve at the house The diiveis each enteied the 
home tliiough the basement dooi, stayed appioxmiately 15 minutes, and then left Detective 
Olsen attested that this pattern is consistent with naicotics tiafficking 
On Decembei 15,2003, Detective Olsen obseived tin ee vehicles amve at Defendant's home 
The diiveis enteied the home tliiough the basement dooi and left 15 minutes later Detective 
Olsen followed one of the cais and, when the cai stopped at a car wash, conveised with the 
dnvei The dnvei informed Detective Olsen that the Defendant had shown him a ciystahzed 
substance while he was at the Defendant's home 
Detective Olsen lan checks on the license plates of the vehicles he obseived at the 
Defendant's home and seaiched the cuminal history of the vehicles' legisteied owneis He 
discoveied that seveial of them had a pnoi histoiy of possessing and selling naicotics and 
paiaphernaha Detective Olsen also identified two of the individuals who enteied the 
Defendant's home as individuals he pieviously had anested foi using or possessing naicotics 
oi paiaphernaha 
Detective Olsen stealthily appioached the basement dooi of Defendant's home at 
appioxmiately 9 00 p m on December 16, 2003 Using a stenle swab, he swabbed the outei 
scieen door of the basement and placed the swab m a stenle envelope 
0P1 
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Detective Olsen turned the swab over to DEA Agent Jeff Clark to perform an ion scan 
analysis of the sample. Agent Clark checked the ion scan apparatus and found it to be 
functioning properly. Agent Clark then conducted an ion scan analysis of the swab sample 
and detected the presence of cocaine. 
Upon execution of the search warrant on the Defendant's home, law enforcement officers 
discovered contraband and arrested the Defendant. 
The Defendant first challenges the results of the ion scan, claiming that in collecting and 
analyzing the swab sample from the exterior screen door of the Defendant's basement entry, the State 
committed an illegal search in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant argues 
that the Court should not consider the results of the ion scan analysis in assessing the probable cause 
basis for the warrant. 
Further, the Defendant argues that, even if the Court may consider the ion scan results, they 
do not provide sufficient probable cause in that the results merely show that at least one person who 
touched the basement door had handled cocaine prior to doing so and that the ion scan at best only 
suggests a tenuous connection between illegal activity and the Defendant or his home. The 
Defendant also argues that the informant statements lack indicia of reliability and had become stale 
prior to the issuing of the warrant, and that the information from the surveillance does not establish 
probable cause sufficient to support a warrant. 
a?? 
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II. ANALYSIS 
At the outset, the Court comments that it has struggled with this case, as the police conduct 
in this case appears to have stretched the boundaries of warrantless investigation to the very limits 
of constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment. The circumstances of this investigation in many 
aspects closely resemble actions that have been held to violate citizens' constitutional rights. 
However, after careful consideration, the Court opines that the police conduct here lies within—but 
barely within—the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
Although Judge Dutson, in issuing the search warrant, determined that the affidavit showed 
sufficient probable cause, the Court now must examine the affidavit. 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation . . . . " U.S. Const, amend IV. 
Thus, a search or seizure is per se unreasonable if conducted outside the judicial process and 
without a warrant, unless the circumstances of the situation justify a narrowly-drawn exception. State 
v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1981). 
However, as the proponent of a motion to suppress, the Defendant has the burden of 
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or 
seizure. State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1058 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In order to establish a 
violation of constitutional rights, the Defendant must make a threshold demonstration of an 
expectation of privacy in the area searched. Id. at 1058. Further, this expectation of privacy must 
OF'3 
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include an actual and subjective expectation of privacy, and it must be such that society is willing 
to recognize it as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
A. Entry Into The Curtilage 
The law recognizes that a person's greatest and most reasonable expectation of privacy exists 
within the person's home, and the law accordingly protects the private home from government 
intrusion more zealously than it does other locations. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
589 (1980) ("People have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their own homes."). 
This heightened protection of the privacy of the home covers not only the interior of the 
home itself, but it extends also to the curtilage, or the area that "harbors the intimate activity 
associated with the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life." United States v. Dunn, 480 
U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (internal quotations omitted). This recognition of the curtilage essentially 
protects families and personal privacy "in an area intimately linked to the home, both physically and 
psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170,180(1984). 
Despite this heightened expectation of privacy, entry into certain areas of the curtilage may 
not constitute a violation of the resident's reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that "an open pathway to the front door was an implied invitation to 
members of the public to enter thereon." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1980), cert, denied, 454* 
U.S. 1057 (1981). Explaining this holding, the Utah Court of Appeals said, "Since it may reasonably 
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be expected that such a pathway could be used by strangers, the police officers in Lee were held to 
be lawfully on the pathway [to the entrance to the residence] when they observed stolen property 
through a window of a camper parked in defendant's driveway." Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058. 
In an oft-cited case discussing this principle, termed the "open-view" doctrine, the Supreme 
Court of Washington said: 
The presence of an officer within the curtilage of a residence does not automatically 
amount to an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Rather, it must be determined 
under the facts of each case just how private the particular observation point actually 
was. It is clear that police with legitimate business may enter areas of the curtilage 
which are impliedly open, such as access routes to the house. In so doing, they are 
free to keep their eyes open. An officer is permitted the same license to intrude as a 
reasonably respectful citizen. However, a substantial and unreasonable departure 
from such an area, or a particularly intrusive method of viewing, will exceed the 
scope of the implied invitation and intrude upon a constitutionally protected 
expectation of privacy. 
Washington v. Seagull 632 P.2d 44, 47 (Wash. 1981). 
While Utah case law clearly endorses this principle, see Atwood, 831 P.2d at 1058-59; Lee, 
633 P.2d at 51, it has not fleshed out the application of this principle to a variety of factual settings, 
as cases from other jurisdictions adopting this doctrine have done. See, e.g., California v. Thompson, 
270 Cal. Rptr. 863 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that, after entering backyard on legitimate police 
business, police observation of illegal activity in defendant's chicken coop did not constitute illegal 
search); California v. Willard, 47 Cal. Rptr. 734 (Ct. App. 1965) (After entering curtilage without 
a warrant, police officers standing on steps leading to side door observed illegal activity through 
screen door without violating "substantial, if any, degree of privacy to the area."); Trimble v. 
Indiana, 816 N.E.2d 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that police may enter the curtilage via the 
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primary residential entry way, but holding that officers substantially exceeded the limits of the 
implied invitation when they entered backyard, inspected a doghouse and removed a neglected and 
emaciated dog); Maine v. Cloutier,544 A.2d 1277 (Maine 1988) (motion to suppress denied where 
officer investigating complaint of barking dog approached the side door of a residence and glimpsed 
marijuana growing operation through basement window): Minnesota v. Crea, 233 N.W.2d 736,738-
39 (Minn. 1975) (holding that police officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by viewing 
evidence visible from an open driveway while they were on the curtilage conducting legitimate 
police business); Oregon v. Somfleth, 8 P.3d 221, 225 (Ore. Ct. App. 2000) (recognizing implied 
invitation to approach entry under open-view doctrine, but holding that entry into fenced backyard 
exceeded scope). The Court considers the cases explaining the open-view doctrines of Washington 
and Idaho to be among the most informative and generally well-reasoned cases discussing the open-
view principle. 
These cases hold that an officer is permitted the same license to intrude as a reasonably 
respectful citizen. See, e ^ , Washington v. Rose, 909 P.2d 280, 285 (Wash. 1996) ("An officer may 
act as any reasonably respectful citizen. Such a person can be expected to stand virtually anywhere 
on a porch . . . while waiting for a response from the door, and to look inside while waiting."); 
Washington v. Chapman, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1297 ("If a government official does not go 
beyond those areas impliedly open to the public, no privacy interest is invaded."); Doe v. Idaho, 965 
P.2d 816, 819 (Idaho 1998) ("When the police come onto private property to conduct an 
investigation . , . and restrict their movements to places ordinary visitors could be expected to go, 
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observations made from such vantage points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment.") (quoting 
Idaho v. Rigoulot, 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); Idaho v. Clark, 859 P.2d 344, 349 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (''Police officers without a warrant are permitted the same intrusion and the 
same level of observation as one would expect from a 'reasonably respectful citizen.'") (quoting 
Idaho v. LimberhancL 788 P.2d 857, 863 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990). 
A police officer's right to enter the walkway or entranceway of a residence is not absolute, 
but arises from the owner's implied invitation. Maine v. Cloutier, 544 A.2d 1277,1280 (Me. 1988). 
However, absent a clear indication of the resident's intent to bar persons from entering the area, an 
established approach to the residence is not a private area, but open to those with a legitimate social 
or business purpose. See Washington v. Zamechek, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 369 (holding that while 
a "no trespassing" sign was relevant, it was not dispositive; it was unclear whether the residents 
wished to bar access to the driveway, the house, or the woods adjacent to the sign). Within a 
reasonable interpretation of the resident's implied consent, an officer may conduct himself as a 
reasonably respectful citizen would. Seagull 632 P.2d at 47. "Only a substantial and unreasonable 
departure [from an entry area or from the conduct of a reasonably respectful citizen] constitutes a 
search." Chapman, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 1297. Police officers need not walk a tightrope line, 
Seagull 632 P.2d at 49, nor "adhere to the most direct route possible" to an entry, Idaho v. Clark, 
859 P.2d 344, 352 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); see also Washington v. Drumhiller, 675 P.2d 631, 633 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that "a minimal departure from the usual access route to the front 
door was not unreasonable"). 
OB 7 
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Determinations of whether police conduct exceeded that of a reasonably respectful citizen 
cannot be made by a fixed formula, but necessarily turn on the material facts and circumstances in 
each case. Seagull 632 P.2d at 47. 
Here, Detective Olsen entered the curtilage and approached the residence at an established 
entry way. Although the basement door that he approached was not the front door, it was an 
established entry way. Detective Olsen had observed during surveillance that the resident of the house 
received at least some visitors through the basement door. The fact that the resident received some 
visitors through the basement door does not necessarily mean that the resident received all visitors 
through the basement door or that it was the main entrance open to all members of the public. 
However, it is enough that a reasonable person who, like Detective Olsen, observed the resident 
receive visitors through the basement door would believe that the basement door was an acceptable 
way to contact the resident of the house. There is no indication that Detective Olsen approached the 
residence along anything but an established access way such as the driveway or sidewalk. Further, 
there is no indication that Detective Olsen encroached upon impermissible areas of the curtilage in 
reaching the basement door. 
Detective Olsen approached the basement door at approximately 9:00 p.m., an hour well past 
nightfall in December. Although this was a somewhat late hour, it was not so late as to cause a 
reasonable person with a legitimate business or social purpose to believe that the resident of the 
home would refuse a visitor. 
ars 
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Detective Olsen's conduct upon reaching the basement door did not exceed that of a 
reasonably respectful member of the public. While the average member of the public does not swab 
the door when calling on a stranger, such conduct does not exceed that which is socially acceptable. 
More importantly, there is no indication that the Defendant made any objective manifestation of a 
subjective intent to shield the exterior of the screen door from public observation, and the resident 
should reasonably expect that a legitimate social or business caller would touch the door when 
attempting to contact a resident. In fact, a reasonable person might find contact with a sterile swab 
to be less intrusive than contact with a visitor's unsterile or perhaps even dirty hand. Swabbing the 
exterior of a door is not a particularly intrusive method of viewing so as to exceed the scope of the 
implied invitation and intrude upon a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy. Further, 
swabbing the door does not constitute a seizure because a resident does not have a significant 
possessory interest in the tiny particles captured by the swab. 
Taking a swab sample from the exterior of a door through which a resident receives visitors 
does not compare to the impermissible search of a resident's garbage cans before they are taken to 
the curb for removal. Such a comparison is misplaced because garbage is only protected from open 
view to the extent that the resident makes some reasonable attempt to shield the garbage from public 
observation. An officer approaching a house on legitimate business might notice contraband piled 
in an uncovered garbage can in open view next to the front door. The officer might even lawfully 
photograph the contraband for later analysis under a magnifying glass without conducting a search. 
<F 
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Moreover, Detective Olsen had a legitimate purpose for entry onto the curtilage. For the 
open-view exception to apply, the officers must enter the curtilage on legitimate police business. 
Seagull 632 P.2d at 47. "A criminal investigation is as legitimate a societal purpose as any other 
undertaking that would normally take a person to another's front door." Idaho v. Clark, 859 P 2d 
344, 350 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Idaho v. Rigoulot 846 P.2d 918, 923 (Idaho Ct. App. 
1992)). "When the police come onto private property to conduct an investigation . . . and restrict 
their movements to places ordinary visitors could be expected to go, observations from such vantage 
points are not covered by the Fourth Amendment." Doe v. Idaho, 965 P.2d 816, 819 (Idaho 1998) 
(quoting Rigoulot, 846 P.2d at 923). 
Clearly, where police, in responding to a complaint regarding public safety, or investigating 
an unrelated matter, inadvertently discover incriminating evidence, they are on legitimate police 
business. However, where the police investigation initially focuses on the resident, courts from other 
jurisdictions have disagreed as to what constitutes legitimate police business. 
In Seagull, the Washington Supreme Court stated that a factual determination of whether the 
officers' actions were reasonable depended upon the totality of the circumstances. The court then 
discussed several factors in determining whether the officers exceeded the scope of the implied 
invitation. 632 P.2d at 48-49. Subsequent courts have listed those factors in their analysis of whether 
officers were on legitimate police business. The Court notes that these factors are not exclusive, nor 
is any alone dispositive. Further, some factors more appropriately weigh upon the issue of whether 
090 
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the officers' conduct was unreasonable than they do whether the officer had a legitimate police 
purpose. 
These issues are related. A determination that an officer acted unreasonably and exceeded 
the scope of the implied invitation also might indicate that the officer had an ulterior purpose. 
Further, where officers exceed the scope of the implied invitation, they likely violate the resident's 
constitutional rights, and the violation of a person's constitutional rights cannot be a legitimate 
police purpose. However, for the purpose of analysis, these issues are distinct, and the Court assesses 
whether Detective Olsen had a legitimate police business when entering the Defendant's curtilage 
by examining the totality of the circumstances, giving each factor its due weight. 
The factors that the Seagull court discussed were whether the officer: (1) spied into the house, 
(2) acted secretly, (3) approached the house in daylight, (4) used the normal, most direct access route 
to the house, (5) attempted to talk with the resident, (6) created an artificial vantage point, and (7) 
made the discovery accidentally. Id. (as examined in Washington v. Ross, 959 P.2d 1188, 1190 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998), aff d, 4 P.3d 130 (Wash. 2000)). 
A study of these factors reveals that they together attempt to prevent the expansion and abuse 
of the open-view doctrine. Clearly, the open-view doctrine cannot become an alternative to seeking 
a search warrant based upon probable cause. However, giving inordinate weight to any of these 
factors distorts the open-view doctrine, both stripping it of its effectiveness and removing it from its 
underlying principles: namely, that a reasonable resident does not object to visitors contacting him 
at the entry of his residence, that a resident has no reasonable expectation of privacy in areas where 
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a reasonable resident would anticipate observation, and that society does not normally consider such 
minimally intrusive entrance into the curtilage to be a violation of the resident's privacy. 
The first factor examines whether the officer spied into the inside of the house. Not all 
observation of the inside of the house constitutes spying. A resident does not have an expectation 
of privacy in activity that is readily visible and observed through an uncovered window. However, 
a resident may have a reasonable expectation of privacy from an officer who intently stares into a 
window from a short distance, perhaps even pressing his nose up against the glass and shielding his 
eyes to reduce the glare, particularly if the window has partially drawn blinds or curtains. At any rate, 
this factor merits little consideration, since there is no indication that Detective Olsen spied into the 
Defendant' s home. 
The second and third Seagull factors examine whether the officer acted secretly or under 
cover of darkness. Both Washington and Idaho courts have weighed these factors heavily, the latter 
stating that Idaho has a tradition of opposition to covert searches at night. Idaho v. Cada, 923 p.2d 
469, 478 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) ("Historically, there has been a strong aversion to nighttime 
searches. . . . Furtive intrusion late at night or in the predawn hours is not conduct that is expected 
from ordinary visitors.") 
In Washington v. Ross. 959 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), aff d, 4 P.3d 130 
(Wash. 2000)), officers made an initial entry onto the defendant's curtilage solely for the purpose 
of sniffing for marijuana at 8:30 p.m. After only one of the officers could smell the marijuana on that 
visit, the officers returned again after midnight in order to strengthen the affidavit by allowing the 
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othei officei anothei opportunity to smell manjuana Although the court of appeals held that the 
police conduct was an impiopei search, and the Washington Supieme Couit affnmed, it did so 
without considei mg the 8 30 p m seaich because it had been stncken from the affidavit suppoilmg 
the wairant The court held that 12 10 am was "an houi when no leasonably lespectful citizen 
would be welcome absent actual invitation oi an emeigency " Ross, 4 P 3d at 136 
In contiast, Detective Olsen approached the Defendant's lesidence to swab the dooi at 
appioximately 9 00 p m, well aftei daik but nanowly withm a socially acceptable time for a 
legitimate business oi social call While it appeals that Detective Olsen may have acted secietly, 
perhaps even waiting until after nightfall in older to minimize the likelihood of discovery, the Court 
would not consider that fact fatal to the open-view doctrine Because the legality of the officer's 
conduct depends upon the implied consent of the lesident, by acting coveitly, the officer does deny 
the lesident the opportunity to ievoke his consent Howevei, that fact has little significance because 
the legal fiction of implied consent depends more on what society consideis to be a peimissible 
intrusion into the cuitilage than on the individual's subjective decision to consent to the intrusion 
In the leal woild, a lesident suspected of illegal activities likely would not consent—oi at least would 
be foolish to do so, paiticularly if he weie conducting illegal activities on the premises—to police 
entiy onto his piopeity m oidei to investigate the lesident An officei is peimitted the same license 
to mtiude as a leasonably lespectful citizen, even though most people piobably would considei a 
police visit m conjunction with an investigation fai moie intiusive than a social oi business callei 
fiom the public at laige Thus, legaidless of whethei the lesident in leahty would consent to the 
o 
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officer's presence within the curtilage, so long as the officer stays within the realm of socially 
acceptable conduct that a reasonably respectful individual might take, the officer does not violate 
the resident's reasonable expectation of privacy, and any injury to the resident is minimal, even when 
the officer avoids contact with the resident. 
The fourth Seagull factor examines the officer's route to the house. This factor merits little 
consideration here, since the Court has already found that there is no indication that Detective Olsen 
substantially deviated from the established entry as he approached the basement door. 
The fifth factor questions whether the officer attempted to talk with the resident. Although 
the record does not indicate that Detective Olsen attempted to talk with the Defendant when he 
approached the entry and took the swab sample, that fact is not fatal to the open-view doctrine. 
Presumably, an officer's attempt to contact a resident indicates that the officer has a proper 
subjective intent to conduct legitimate police business. However, as the Washington Supreme Court 
has held, the constitutionality of police conduct under the open-view doctrine cannot turn on the 
officer's subjective intent. Washington v. MaxfielcL 886 P.2d 123, 134 n. 39 (Wash. 1994). 
The Washington Court of Appeals addressed the relevance of the officer's subjective intent 
as follows: 
An officer's underlying intent or motivation is irrelevant to the judicial inquiry into 
the lawfulness of the officer's conduct. Whether a constitutional violation has 
occurred turns on an objective assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts 
and circumstances confronting the officer at the time and not on the officer's actual 
state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken. Thus, if an individual has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular area, the police may enter on a 
hunch, a fishing expedition for evidence, or for no good reason at all. 
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Washington v. Petty, 740 P.2d 879, 882 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
A reasonable caller seeking an audience with the resident, after getting no response at the 
door, likely might wander through the more open areas within the curtilage to check whether perhaps 
the resident was present but someplace outside of the house. In contrast, where an officer does not 
even attempt to contact the resident, the officer has much less freedom to deviate from the direct 
routes to and from the entry in order to stay within the scope of an implied invitation. Where an 
officer is on the property solely to investigate crime without contacting the resident, that officer must 
adhere particularly closely to the approach and behavior that a respectful person would utilize if he 
were attempting to contact the resident. 
The sixth factor asks whether the officer created an artificial vantage point. An officer who 
climbs a tree to stare through a second-story window, or who stands on a stool to peer over a window 
sill has moved from the role of an impliedly invited social or business caller and has begun to act like 
a peeping torn. While this factor is not present here in the sense of an artificially elevated vantage 
point, this factor could be compared to an artificial technology that enhances the officer's sensual 
perception. The ion scan does reveal the presence of trace amounts of contraband that the officer 
could not otherwise naturally observe. However, in doing so, it does not negate or counteract any 
action or measures that the resident may have taken in order to shield himself or his activities from 
observation; it does not circumvent any object that otherwise would shield any activity from view. 
The ion scan merely provides a detailed examination of evidence that already is unshielded from the 
public. As discussed below, the ion scan is not a substitute for observation of the interior of the 
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residence. Thus, the ion scan does not enhance the officer's vantage point for the purpose of a 
warrantless search. 
The seventh factor examines whether the officer made the discovery accidentally. 
Understandably, there is less potential for police abuse of the open-view doctrine where the officer 
does not intend to discover the illegal activity. However, as the Washington Supreme Court has held, 
"There is no inadvertence requirement under the open-view doctrine. The conduct of an officer at 
residential premises does not exceed the open-view doctrine just because the officer is there 
deliberately to look for evidence of a crime." Washington v. Rose, 909 P.2d 280,283 (Wash. 1996) 
(citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2(a), at 323 (2d ed. 1987)). See also Washington 
v. MaxfielcL 886 P.2d 123 (Wash. 1994) (fact that investigator entered property with sole purpose 
of investigating suspected marijuana grow did not foreclose open-view doctrine). 
Other courts have treated the analysis of these factors differently, particularly the factors of 
secrecy and whether the officers attempted to contact the resident. For example, the Washington 
Court of Appeals applied the Seagull principles in Ross to hold that police impermissibly violated 
Ross's privacy. 959 P.2d 1188 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), aff d, 4 P.3d 130 (Wash. 2000)). There the 
appellate court held that when agents approached the defendant's property in an unmarked car and 
entered the property through a side route, after dark, with the intent of discovering criminal activity, 
and without identifying themselves, these factors combined to make the intrusion unreasonable. Id. 
at 1191. However, the Court notes that the proper analysis hinges upon the totality of the 
circumstances and cautions against taking any one factor, even the factor at the heart of one court's 
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analysis, as being dispositive on its own. While secrecy, cover of darkness, and the officer's attempt 
to contact the resident may have been central to the decisions of courts assessing the totality of the 
circumstances in other cases, these factors do not carry the same weight in the circumstances 
presently before the Court in this case. 
Additionally, the Court considers the Maine Supreme Court's discussion of whether an 
officer is acting on legitimate police business to be particularly well-reasoned. That court said: 
To come within the implied invitation, a police officer must be on some police 
business. That does not necessarily mean that the officer has to have probable cause 
or even an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The police 
business may be administrative as well as investigative, and it may be based on a 
suspicion that turns out to be without substantial basis, provided the suspicion is held 
in good faith rather than a pretext for an arbitrary search. 
Maine v. Cloutier. 544 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Maine 1988). 
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy rights only against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Where a police officer makes only a minimal entry onto the curtilage of the 
residence and, while there, limits his activity to unintrusive behavior that would raise no objection 
from a reasonable individual if the officer were a member of the public at large rather than a 
government agent, a resident cannot rightfully protest that the action is an unreasonable search 
merely because the actor is an officer. 
As a contrasting example of a case involving police conduct outside of legitimate police 
business, the Court notes Washington v. Dykstra, 926 P.2d 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996), where 
officers arrested a defendant for driving while intoxicated. Despite a test indicating that the 
defendant had a blood alcohol concentration of .20, the police chief and an officer decided to release 
Ruling 
Case No. 041900483 
Page 19 of 28 
the defendant into the "custody" of his residence. The officers did not merely drop him off at his 
residence but insisted upon accompanying him inside. One officer told the defendant, "I know you 
have marijuana in your house and I am not leaving until you go in the house." The defendant told 
the officers that they had no right to enter his house and that they were "uninvited." When the 
defendant finally agreed to open the back porch door to enter his house, he tried to keep the door as 
closed as possible in order to prevent the officers from seeing inside his house. However, when he 
opened the door, the officers who were standing on the back porch glimpsed what appeared to be a 
bag of marijuana on the kitchen counter. Affirming the suppression of the evidence the police found, 
the Washington Court of Appeals held that the police officers had exceeded their legitimate police 
business and invaded the defendant's privacy by insisting on accompanying the him into his 
residence. As a blatant abuse of the open-view doctrine, in contrast to the present case, the officers 
in Dykstra acted coercively, the defendant there explicitly revoked the implied invitation, and the 
officers intentionally violated the defendant's privacy by exceeding the conduct of a reasonably 
responsible member of the public. 
The Court also notes that the open-view doctrine is somewhat self-limiting by its very nature. 
The open-view doctrine is not a substitute for a search warrant. Even where an officer discovers 
illegal activity via the open-view doctrine, absent some independent exigency that would justify 
immediate seizure, the officer still must seek a warrant from a magistrate prior to effecting a seizure 
or arrest. See Idaho v. Clark, 859 P.2d 344, 349 n.3 (uAn open view observation alone, absent 
exigent circumstances or other Fourth Amendment justification, does not authorize a warrantless 
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seizure or entry into an area where a privacy interest does exist. However, what is seen in open view 
may furnish probable cause for obtaining a warrant.") (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 
(1983)). 
The Court therefore holds that Detective Olsen did not violate Defendant's reasonable 
expectation of privacy when he entered the curtilage and collected the swab sample from the 
Defendant's basement screen door. 
B. The Ion Scan 
Absent vigilance by the courts, new electronic devices may erode the privacy guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment. Recognizing this concern, the Supreme Court of the United States has held 
that where the State uses a technological device that is not in general public use to discover 
information regarding the interior of the home that previously could not have been discovered 
without physical intrusion constitutes a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. 
Kyllo v. United States. 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Kyllo majority, drew a bright, firm line "at the entrance to the 
house." Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). The majority held that law 
enforcement officers who used an infrared heat imaging device to detect heat emissions from within 
a building made an impermissible search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Significantly, four 
justices dissented, arguing that the infrared imaging device did nothing more than "passively 
measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces" of the building. 533 U.S. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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Several distinctions appear between the majority and minority reasoning. The Kyllo majority 
criticizes the minority for trying to create an untenable distinction between teclinology that reveals 
only crude information from inside the home and more precise technology that reveals "intimate 
details" from inside the home. Id. at 38-39. The minority criticizes the majority as failing to 
distinguish between through-the-wall searches and off-the-wall searches, calling the majority's rule 
too broad because it "effectively treats the mental process of analyzing data obtained from external 
sources as the equivalent of physical intrusion into the home." Id. at 49. 
Thus, for the Kyllo majority, the decision turned on whether the teclinology revealed 
information of the interior of the home that normally would be unknowable without physical 
intrusion, id. at 40, while the minority characterized the thermal-imaging device as an examination 
of the exterior of the home that revealed no details of the home's interior and that would be 
permissible under the plain view doctrine. 
A perfunctory reading of Kyllo might give the impression that the majority mistrusted all 
sensory-enhancing teclinology, while the minority would allow any sensory enliancing teclinology 
so long as it was employed outside the home. However, both the majority and the minority intimated 
that the use of a sensory-enhancing device would be a search if it revealed sufficient information 
regarding the interior of the home. For the Kyllo majority, this search occurs whenever the 
information revealed could not normally be obtained without physical intrusion into the home. For 
the minority, that criteria is too broad, and a search occurs only when the teclinology provides the 
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functional equivalent to being inside the home, that is, something beyond mere inferences made from 
data obtained from external sources. 
Ultimately, the essential distinction between the Supreme Court's opinion in Kyllo and that 
of the dissent is that the majority characterized the thermal-imaging device as detecting heat from 
within the home, while the dissent characterized the device as measuring the heat on the exterior of 
the home. Although the minority criticized the majority for failing to recognize the distinction 
between an off-the-wall teclinology and a through-the-wall teclinology, in reality, the majority 
actually recognized the distinction but held that the thermal-imaging device was a through-the-wall 
technology. 
In the case at bar, the Court holds that the ion scan did not reveal any information regarding 
the interior of the home. The ion scan did not explore details of the home that previously would have 
been unknowable without physical intrusion into the home. The swabbing of the door and the 
subsequent ion scan did not reveal details to Detective Olsen that he otherwise would have had to 
enter the Defendant's home to discover; this technique was not a substitute for physical entry into 
the home. In fact, the ion scan revealed information that an entry and search of the home could not 
have revealed—the microscopic presence of cocaine residue on the exterior of the screen door. 
Under the reasoning of the Kyllo minority, the ion scan clearly was not a search because it 
did not provide "the functional equivalent of actual presence" in Defendant's home. Id. at 47. 
More importantly, even according to the Kyllo majority's reasoning, the ion scan was not a search 
because it did not reveal "any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
1 
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have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," and thus did 
not violate the firm, bright line that the Supreme Court has drawn at the entrance to the home. 
Although the Third Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the results of an ion scan on a swab 
sample taken from an exterior doorknob in United States v. Charles, 29 Fed. Appx. 892, 2002 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 3699 (2002), it did so by holding that the doorknob "fell within the curtilage of the 
house," not because the ion scan technology constituted an impermissible search of the interior of 
the home. Further, Charles is not authoritative to this Court, nor is Charles' reasoning persuasive 
because the Third Circuit did not examine the so-called open-view doctrine or its logical 
underpinnings, and the Court today holds that Detective Olsen was conducting legitimate police 
business and was lawfully within the Defendant's curtilage only to the extent that a reasonably 
responsible member of the general public would enter the property to contact the Defendant at an 
entrance where the Defendant willingly receives visitors. 
C. Probable Cause 
Defendant contends that, even with the results of the ion scan test, the affidavit did not show 
probable cause to support the warrant. While the positive results of the test would not support a 
warrant by themselves, the Court does not examine the affidavit in a piecemeal fashion but rather 
views the affidavit in its totality. State v. Jackson. 937 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). This 
requires the Court to consider the results of the surveillance of Defendant's residence, the traffic 
pattern observed and the criminal history of the registered owners of the cars spotted at Defendant's 
residence, the statement from the driver of the car leaving Defendant's residence, the statement of 
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the driver who claimed that the methamphetamine that police discovered in his possession came 
from the Defendant approximately a year before the affiant executed the affidavit, and the positive 
results of the ion scan test. While none of these facts taken individually would constitute probable 
cause sufficient to support an application for a warrant, taken together, these facts reinforce and 
corroborate each other. The court examines each in turn. 
First, the traffic pattern that Detective Olsen observed was consistent with drug trafficking. 
Two sets of cars arrived on two separate occasions, each time staying only for 10 to 15 minutes 
before leaving separately. The drivers entered the residence through the basement door instead of 
approaching the front door, which likely might have invited greater notice from neighbors. Detective 
Olsen affirmed that, from his training, he recognized the traffic pattern as consistent with drug 
trafficking. Taken alone, this traffic pattern perhaps would not raise any suspicion, as there might 
be any number of legitimate explanations for it. 
The criminal histories of the registered owners of the cars taken by themselves would not rise 
to probable cause, although they do raise considerably more suspicion when coupled with the traffic 
pattern. Merely the status of the car owners as convicted drug traffickers or users does not constitute 
probable cause to believe that they are renewing their past criminal activities. However, when people 
with a history of drug abuse or trafficking meet together in a pattern consistent with drug trafficking, 
the inference that they are in fact participating in such activities becomes very reasonable. 
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By itself, the December 2002 statement of a driver caught with methamphetamine that he 
obtained the drugs from the Defendant at his residence would both be stale and lack reliability. 
Although drug trafficking is an ongoing activity, and staleness is not merely a function of time, in 
this context, a year is too long for the statement to constitute probable cause that the same illegal 
activity is occurring at the residence. Further, an informant who is caught in possession of 
contraband has considerable incentive to fabricate a stoiy of the contraband's origin. However, the 
year-old statement need not be taken at face value. The subsequent surveillance and statement by 
another informant to the same effect as the year-old statement both rejuvenates and corroborates the 
year-old statement. 
The more recent statement by the informant who stopped at a car wash after leaving the 
Defendant's residence does not suffer from as much of a credibility problem, as the informant likely 
would not have the need to explain the origins of contraband. However, an informant under these 
circumstances may have an incentive to attempt to cuny favor with the police. But, here both the 
recent surveillance and the year-old statement corroborate the informant's statement. 
Even the ion scan by itself would not constitute probable cause. The ion scan shows that 
someone who has been in contact with contraband has also been in contact with the door. Absent 
other indicators, the ion scan does not show a nexus between the illegal activity and the residence. 
As the Defendant argues, the fact that known past narcotics users or traffickers had visited the 
residence might by itself explain the presence of trace amounts of contraband on the door. As another 
court has noted, "A completely innocent [person] could have in his or her possession, at any time, 
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currency that happened to be involved in a drug transaction at some unknown time in the past." 
Pennsylvania v. $11,600.00 Cash, 858 A.2d 160 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (Kelley, J., dissenting 
1996). Thus, there may be legitimate explanations for the presence of trace amounts of contraband 
on the exterior of Defendant's screen door. 
However, probable cause does not require an absence of an innocent explanation. Rather, the 
standard for probable cause concerns the probability of criminal activity, rather than a prima facie 
showing. State v. Treadwav, 499 P.2d 846, 847-48 (Utah 1972). 
When viewed in its totality, in a common-sense fashion, the affidavit sufficiently sets forth 
probable cause. While perhaps none of the individual parts of the affidavit alone could indicate 
probable cause, taken together in view of the totality of the circumstances, they combine to give 
adequate support for the warrant. Further, while the Court cannot say definitively that, even without 
the ion scan, the warrant would have sufficient probable cause support, it is likely that it would. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Detective Olsen entered the curtilage of Defendant's residence furtively in the dark intending 
to take a sample from the Defendant's door without contacting the Defendant. However, in doing 
so, Detective Olsen conducted himself in a reasonably respectful manner, generally adhering to an 
established access route to the residence in an area implicitly open to public observation. Further, 
the subsequent ion scan analysis of the sample was not an intrusive search because it did not reveal 
any information about the interior of the residence. Thus, the State did not infringe upon a reasonable 
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expectation of privacy on the part of the Defendant. Finally, the affidavit, taken as a whole and read 
in a common-sense fashion, indicates sufficient probable cause to support a search warrant. 
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's motion to suppress. 
Dated this T day of January, 2005. 
Michael D. Lyon, Judge ] 
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